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In its recent judgments on preliminary objections in the cases of Alleged 
Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v Colombia) and the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua  v  Colombia), the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) had to deal with arguments based on a contrario interpretation. This form of 
interpretation, according to which “the fact that a provision expressly provides for one 
category of situations is said to justify the inference that other comparable categories 
are excluded”, has been addressed several times in the jurisprudence of the Court and 
its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”). Yet, despite 
assertions that the maxim of interpretation would “find a place in the logic of the 
nursery”, there remain fundamental questions about both its character and its operation. 
This article addresses two of those questions: how has a contrario interpretation been 
used in the practice of the PCIJ and ICJ, and how might we explain the importance 
attributed to it? 
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I. Introduction
In its recent judgments on preliminary objections in the cases of Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua  v  Colombia)1 (“Alleged Violations”)  and the 
Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua 
and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast 
(Nicaragua v Colombia)2 (“Question of the Delimitation”), the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) had to deal with arguments based on a contrario 
interpretation. This form of interpretation, according to which “the fact 
that a provision expressly provides for one category of situations is said 
to justify the inference that other comparable categories are excluded”,3 
has been addressed several times in the jurisprudence of the Court and 
its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”). 
Yet, despite assertions that the maxim of interpretation would “find a 
place in the logic of the nursery”,4 there remain fundamental questions 
1. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean 
Sea (Nicaragua v Colombia), [2016] ICJ Rep 36 [Alleged Violations].
2. Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and 
Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua 
v Colombia), Preliminary Objections, [2016] ICJ Rep 32 [Question of the 
Delimitation].
3. Alleged Violations, supra note 1 at para 37.
4. Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, 1d (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 
399. Lord McNair uses the expression expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
– literally, “expression of the one is exclusion of the other”. He considers 
this to be synonymous with a contrario interpretation, with the latter 
terminology more frequently adopted in continental Europe, at 400. 
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about both its character and its operation. In this article, we intend to 
address two of those questions: how has a contrario interpretation been 
used in the practice of the PCIJ and ICJ, and how might we explain the 
importance attributed to it? 
Whilst the academic literature on interpretation, in general, has grown 
exponentially since the conclusion of the Vienna Convention,5 a contrario 
interpretation remains both an understudied and elusive phenomenon.6 
The principle does not clearly fit within the schema of the Vienna 
Convention nor is it applicable in every instance of interpretation. In an 
academic landscape dominated by the study of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention, interpretative principles that are not expressly listed 
in those provisions fall through the cracks. The academic commentary 
and rare judicial decisions that address the principle demonstrate that 
there is disagreement over its most basic characteristics. Some authors 
contend that the principle has neither an autonomous role nor a fixed 
function, functioning as an ex post facto justification for interpretation 
made on other grounds,7 whilst other commentators contend that the 
maxim is nothing more than a “principle of common sense”.8 
The relative scarcity of commentary on the principle leaves many 
5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980) [Vienna Convention].
6. One notable modern exception is Robert Kolb, Interprétation et Création 
du Droit International (Brussels: Bruylant, 2006) at 748-56. 
7. Charles de Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation judiciaire en droit 
international public (Paris: Pedone, 1963) at 113. Cf. James W Garner 
& Valentine Jobst, “Codification of International Law: Part III – Law of 
Treaties” (1935) 29 American Journal of International Law Supplement 
653 at 947 (“in all probability [the maxims of interpretation] developed 
as neat ex post facto descriptions or justifications of decisions arrived at by 
mental processes more complicated than the mere mechanical application 
of rules to a text”). 
8. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the 
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) at 26 (a contrario 
interpretation belonged to a category of canons of interpretation the 
application of which is “so commonsensical that, were the canons not 
couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe anyone could criticize 
them”). 
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questions unanswered. However, the World Court has engaged with the 
principle both in response to arguments advanced by parties as well as by 
raising it proprio motu, shedding light on the character and operation of the 
principle and its relationship to the provisions of the Vienna Convention.9 
The treatment of the principle by the Court is consonant with the general 
approach to interpretation adopted at the Vienna Conference, which 
finds its roots in a voluntarist approach to international law.10 Yet, its 
highly context-specific nature reminds us that interpretation is as much 
a matter of appreciation of circumstances and context on the part of the 
interpreter as it is a straight-forward application of codified rules. In this 
respect, a contrario interpretation is just another means of “arriving at the 
intention of the parties in an imperfectly expressed document”.11 
II.  A Contrario Interpretation in the Jurisprudence 
of the World Court 
One does not have to search far for the first inclusion of a contrario 
interpretation in the jurisprudence of the Court. In fact, the issue arose 
in the very first contentious case which came before the Court, the Case 
of the S.S. Wimbledon.12 The S.S. Wimbledon was an English steamship 
that was chartered to a French company from 1919 to 1921. In March 
1921, it loaded 4,200 tons of ammunition at Salonica (now called 
Thessaloniki) in Greece, bound for Danzig, Poland. After rounding the 
mainland of western Europe and travelling up the English Channel, the 
S.S. Wimbledon presented itself at the western entrance to the Kiel Canal, 
9. I submit that the Court’s judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v Colombia), Application for Permission by Honduras to 
Intervene, [2011] ICJ Rep 420 at para 29, is to be distinguished as the 
Court is not interpreting a treaty, but refers to the judgment of the Court 
in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras), 
Application by Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene, [1990] ICJ Rep 92, 
which interprets certain provisions of the Statute.
10. Cf. Kolb, supra note 6 at 749.
11. Commissioner of Taxes v Aktiebolaget Tetra Pak, (1966) 45 ILR 427 
(Appellate Division of High Court (Southern Rhodesia)) at 433, per 
Beadle CJ. 
12. (1923), PCIJ (Ser A) No 1 at 21 [Wimbledon].
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a 61-mile canal situated in German territory and which joins the North 
Sea to the Baltic. It was refused entry on the basis that it was carrying 
ammunition bound for Poland. Germany had declared itself to be neutral 
in the on-going Russo-Polish war, and argued that its territory could not 
be used for transit that benefitted one of the belligerent states. 
After fruitless negotiations with the German government, Britain, 
France, Italy, and Japan brought a case against Germany alleging that it 
was in breach of its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles,13 the peace 
treaty entered into by Germany and the Allied Powers at the end of the 
First World War. Specifically, the Applicants claimed that Germany had 
breached Article 380 of the Treaty, which provided that “The Kiel Canal 
and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of 
commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of 
entire equality”.14 As the S.S. Wimbledon was both owned and operated 
by states that were at peace with Germany, the Applicants claimed that 
Article 380 clearly protected the right of free passage of the ship.
For its part, Germany claimed that the provisions of the Treaty 
of Versailles allowed it to restrict transit in pursuance of its neutrality. 
Its principal argument was that Article 381(2) of the Treaty permitted 
impediments to passage through the Kiel Canal “arising out of police, 
customs, sanitary, emigration or immigration regulations and those 
relating to the import or export of prohibited goods”.15 None of these 
permissible limitations, the Applicants argued, were relevant to the case 
at hand. This paragraph mirrors exactly the wording of Article 327(4) of 
the Treaty which governs transit to and from ports and transit through 
inland navigation routes. Germany argued that as the two provisions 
are identically worded, they must be interpreted in the same way.16 
As neither provision expressly addressed transit in times of neutrality, 
Germany contended that they must be supplemented by reference to the 
13. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 28 June 1919, 225 CTS 
188 (entered into force 10 January 1920).
14. Ibid, art 380.
15. Ibid, art 381.
16. Case of S.S. Wimbledon, “Counter-Memorial (Additional Volume)”, PCIJ 
(Series C) No 3, at 45-46. 
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“fundamental principles of international law”,17 one of which was that a 
state could prohibit transit through its internal waterways in protection 
of its neutral status. Germany contended that as this must be the case for 
Article 327(4) of the Treaty, it must also be the case for Article 381(2) of 
the Treaty, relating to the Kiel Canal. 
The Court rejected Germany’s argument, stating that “the terms of 
article 380 are categorical and give rise to no doubt”.18 It noted that the 
drafters of the Treaty had intentionally created a “self-contained” separate 
section related to the Kiel Canal and that the rules in that section differed 
from those to which other internal navigable waterways were subjected, 
including Article 327(4). The Court was, therefore, of the view that 
“[t]he idea which underlies Article 380 and the following articles of the 
Treaty [which regulate the Kiel Canal] is not to be sought by drawing 
an analogy from these provisions but rather by arguing a contrario, a 
method of argument which excludes them”.19 Although its reasoning is 
somewhat sparse, the Court appears to be making the following point: 
the inclusion in the Treaty of a special section containing provisions 
related to the Kiel Canal means that the drafters of the Treaty must have 
intended those provisions, and not the provisions related to “standard” 
internal waterways, to govern transit through the Canal; put another 
way, the express inclusion of those provisions excluded the application of 
the general provisions on internal waterways to the Canal. 
Two further points are worth noting with regard to the Court’s 
reasoning. First, it views the a contrario line of reasoning as intimately 
linked to the search for the intention of the parties. It is only because 
one can deduce that the drafters of the Treaty intended to create a 
specific section related to the Kiel Canal that a contrario interpretation 
has any weight. However, the Court could only discern that this was 
the intention of the drafters by referring to the text and context of the 
provisions and the structure of the whole treaty. Second, it is notable that 
the Court concludes that the terms of Article 380 are unambiguous and, 
17. Ibid at 46.
18. Wimbledon, supra note 12 at 22. 
19. Ibid at 24. 
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thus, protect the right of free transit before supporting this conclusion 
with an a contrario argument. Although it may be correct to say that the 
a contrario argument did not dictate the solution in this case, it does not 
seem accurate to state that it “only explained ex post facto the structure of 
the Court’s reasoning”.20 The Court’s a contrario reasoning appears to do 
more than that, acting as confirmation of the intention of the parties that 
had already found expression in the text and context of the provisions of 
the treaty itself. 
The second case that will be examined in this article is the advisory 
opinion of the Permanent Court in Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and 
Poland,21 handed down in 1931. In those proceedings, the Council of the 
League of Nations requested the Court to render an opinion regarding 
whether Lithuania was legally obliged to open a section of railway that 
had been out of use for at least ten years. Prior to its abandonment, the 
railway line was an important method of transporting goods between 
ports on the Baltic Sea, including to and from the Port of Memel, which 
lay in Lithuanian territory. 
Of particular importance was whether the provisions of the Memel 
Convention22 obliged Lithuania to open the railway.23 One of the 
arguments made in favour of opening the railway was based on Article 3 
of Annex III of the Memel Convention, which made reference to another 
instrument, the Statute of Barcelona.24 The latter obliged Lithuania to 
“facilitate free transit, by rail or waterway, on routes in use convenient 
for international transit”.25 As the railway line was not “in use” the Court 
20. de Visscher, supra note 7 at 113.
21. Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Railway Sector Landwarów-
Kaisiadorys) (1931), Advisory Opinion, PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 42 [Railway 
Traffic]. 
22. Convention and Transitory Provision concerning Memel, 8 May 1924, 29 
LNTS 87 (entered into force August 1925).
23. So called because it established the regime of the territory and Port of 
Memel, an area which was placed under French administration following 
the First World War.
24. Convention on Freedom of Transit and Statute of Freedom of Transit, 20 
April 1921, 7 LNTS 11 (entered into force 31 October 1922).
25. Railway Traffic, supra note 21 at 120.
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rejected the contention that this provision obliged Lithuania to open 
the railway. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that Article 
3, Annex III of the Memel Convention itself only obliged Lithuania to 
“permit and grant all facilities for the traffic on the river to or from or 
in the port of Memel”.26 The fact that this provision only mentioned 
waterways, and not railways, confirmed, in the eyes of the Court, that 
Lithuania did not wish to abandon its right to restrict access to railways 
on its territory. In other words, the express inclusion of free transit of 
waterways justified the inference that railways were intentionally not 
covered by that provision. 
In a similar vein to the Wimbledon case, the Permanent Court in 
Railway Traffic rooted the importance of a contrario interpretation in the 
intention of the parties to the Memel Convention. The Court considered 
that it could only have been an intentional act to include waterways but 
not railways in the free transit provisions of the Memel Convention and 
that this intention should therefore be given effect. Second, the Court 
– again, as in the Wimbledon case – used a contrario interpretation as 
a subsidiary means of interpretation. The Court’s a contrario line of 
reasoning is subsequent to, and confirmation of, its conclusion that:
[n]either the Memel Convention nor the Statute of Barcelona to which the 
former refers can be adduced to prove that the Lithuanian Government is 
under an obligation to restore the … railway sector to use and to open it for 
international traffic.27
We can see similar uses of a contrario reasoning in the judgments of the 
present Court. The first judgment of the ICJ to do so was the Tehran 
Hostages case28 between the US and Iran. As is well-known, that case 
related to the storming of the US Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants 
in late 1979 and the taking hostage of at least 48 persons having either 
diplomatic or consular status. After failed attempts to initiate bilateral 
negotiations to secure the release of the hostages, the Secretary-General 
of the UN sent a letter to the President of the Security Council requesting 
26. Ibid at 121 (citing art 3 of Annex III of the Memel Convention). 
27. Ibid. 
28. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v Iran), [1980] ICJ Rep 3 [Tehran Hostages]. 
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that the “Security Council be convened urgently in an effort to seek a 
peaceful solution of the problem”.29 Whilst the Security Council was 
considering the situation in Tehran, the US submitted the dispute to the 
ICJ, basing the jurisdiction of the Court on the compromissory clauses 
of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations (1961)30 and Consular 
Relations (1963).31
As Iran did not submit written pleadings to the Court nor did it 
appear before the Court in oral proceedings,32 the Court was required to 
consider proprio motu any questions of jurisdiction or admissibility that 
might be relevant to the case. Of particular importance was the fact that 
the UN Security Council was “actively seized of the matter” and that the 
UN Secretary-General had been requested by the Security Council to use 
his good offices to search for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Article 12 of 
the UN Charter expressly prohibits the General Assembly from making 
recommendations with regard to a dispute whilst the Security Council is 
exercising its functions under the Charter. It could therefore be argued 
by analogy that the Court should exercise the same restraint in matters of 
which the Security Council was actively seized. 
The Court rejected such an approach for two reasons. First, it 
observed that the Security Council had expressly taken note of the 
Court’s order of provisional measures in a resolution that it had adopted 
29. “Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council” (25 November 1979) UN Doc S/13646.
30. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95 
(entered into force 24 April 1964).
31. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261 
(entered into 19 March 1967).
32. Tehran Hostages, supra note 28. However, Iran did submit two letters 
to the Court in which it argued that the the Court should not exercise 
jurisdiction over the dispute as the situation of the hostages held in the 
US Embassy was part of an “overall problem” involving “more than 25 
years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs 
of Iran”. Ibid at para 37. 
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on the matter.33 In this context, the Court noted that “it does not seem 
to have occurred to any member of the Council that there was or could 
be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective 
functions by the Court and the Security Council”.34 Second, it reasoned 
a contrario that: 
[w]hereas Article 12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly 
to make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while 
the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of that dispute or 
situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court by any 
provision of either the Charter or Statute.35
The reason for the implicit exclusion of the Court from this restriction 
was, in the view of the Court, clear: 
[i]t is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to 
resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; 
and the resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, 
and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the 
dispute.36
The case of Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger)37 provides another 
illustrative example of a contrario interpretation in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The two parties in that case had brought a dispute before 
the Court on the basis of a special agreement, which asked the Court to 
determine the course of a certain sector of the parties’ land boundary. 
The parties agreed that the border should be delimited with reference to 
a 1927 French colonial-era document – referred to as the arrêté – that 
33. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3. 
34. Tehran Hostages, supra note 28 at para 40. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. This reasoning was cited with approval by the Court in subsequent 
case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
Judgment, [1984] ICJ Rep 392, in response to the US argument that “the 
matter [in that case] was essentially one for the Security Council since it 
concerned a complaint by Nicaragua involving the use of force” at para 
93. 
37. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), [2013] ICJ Rep 44 [Niger]. 
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described the boundary between the states when they were both French 
colonies.38 In one particular section, the arrêté stated that the boundary 
lay between two points – the question before the Court was whether the 
boundary was necessarily a straight line between these points, or whether 
it took a less direct route.  
The Court rejected the claim – advanced by Burkina Faso – that the 
boundary between the two points was necessarily a straight line for several 
reasons. First, it noted that the arrêté specified, in relation to two other 
sections, that the boundary between two points should take the form of a 
straight line but did not make a similar stipulation for the section under 
consideration.39 If Burkina Faso’s argument that the boundary between 
two points is necessarily a straight line was correct, then these express 
stipulations would be superfluous. However, the Court noted that this 
was: 
not necessarily enough to exclude the possibility that, in the section here 
under consideration, the inter-colonial boundary followed a straight line …
Nevertheless, the fact that the provisions specifying that certain sections consist 
of straight lines appear in the same document as those providing no precise 
details in respect of other sections, weakens Burkina Faso’s argument that the 
latter provisions, solely by virtue of that lack of detail, should necessarily be 
interpreted as drawing a straight line.40
In order to conclusively reject Burkina Faso’s argument, it examined 
two further pieces of evidence. First, it studied the records of the French 
colonial administration, which – in its view – provided no support for 
the claim that the boundary in that section should be a straight line.41 
Second, the Court highlighted the fact that a town that was administered 
by the colonial predecessor of Niger would be on the ‘wrong side’ of 
38. The Court has frequently reiterated that boundaries inherited from 
colonization are inviolable by virtue of the principle uti possedetis juris; see 
for example, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ 
Rep 554 at para 20.
39. Niger, supra note 37. For example, in relation to one section of the 
boundary, the arrêté specified that the boundary, following “an east-south-
east direction, continues in a straight line up to [an identified] point” at 
para 88.
40. Ibid at para 88. 
41. Ibid at para 93. 
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the boundary if it were held to be a straight line, providing additional 
support for the conclusion that the arrêté should not be interpreted in 
such a manner.42 
A similar pattern can be discerned in the Court’s most recent 
treatment of a contrario interpretation, which occurred in the judgments 
on preliminary objections in the Alleged Violations and the Question of 
the Delimitation cases. Whilst not joined, those cases had a significant 
degree of overlap with respect to the first preliminary objection raised by 
Colombia and thus the Court dealt with that objection identically in both 
cases.43 In those cases, Nicaragua attempted to found the jurisdiction of 
the Court on Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of 
1948,44 more commonly referred to as the Pact of Bogotá. That provision 
provides that the ICJ has jurisdiction over all legal disputes “without 
the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present treaty is 
in force”.45 Whilst both Nicaragua and Colombia were initially states 
parties to the Pact, Colombia denounced the treaty on 27 November 
2012. Article LVI regulates the effect of denunciation, providing that:
The present treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced 
upon one year’s notice, at the end of which period it shall cease to be in force 
with respect to the State denouncing it, but shall continue in force for the 
remaining signatories …
The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures 
initiated prior to the transmission of the particular notification.46
Nicaragua filed its applications in the two cases on 26 November 2013, 
one day before denunciation took effect. In both cases, one of Colombia’s 
principal arguments against the jurisdiction of the Court was based on 
an a contrario interpretation of the second paragraph of Article LVI. 
According to this interpretation, as procedures that were initiated prior 
42. Ibid at para 95.
43. For ease of reference, the paragraph numbers to which I refer are those in 
the Alleged Violations judgment on preliminary objections. 
44. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá), 30 April 1948, 
OASTS No 17 and 61 (entered into force 6 May 1949) [Pact of Bogotá].
45. Ibid, art XXXI.
46. Ibid, art LVI.
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to the transmission of notification of denunciation are not affected by 
denunciation, those initiated after notification must therefore be affected 
by denunciation. Colombia claimed that this leads to the conclusion that 
parties to the Pact cannot bring cases against a state that has denounced 
the Pact in the one-year period after denunciation. 
In response to this argument, the Court stated that an a contrario 
interpretation: 
is only warranted  when it is appropriate in light of the text of all the provisions 
concerned, their context and the object and purpose of the treaty. Moreover, 
even where an a contrario interpretation is justified, it is important to determine 
precisely what inference its application requires in any given case.47
In the view of the Court, the ordinary meaning of Articles XXXI and 
LVI clearly demonstrated that the Pact continued to be in force for the 
denouncing state during the one-year period after notification; it ceased 
to be in force only after this period had expired. As the treaty was “in 
force” between the denouncing state and other states parties to the 
Pact, Article XXXI thus gave the Court jurisdiction over applications 
submitted to it during that period. It noted that this interpretation was 
not only supported by the text of the treaty, but also by the context of the 
provisions and the object and purpose of the Pact. In relation to context, 
the Court observed that if one were to adopt Colombia’s interpretation, 
none of the provisions related to dispute settlement procedures would 
still be in force over the one-year notification period; this would be, in 
the view of the Court, “difficult to reconcile with the express terms of the 
first paragraph of Article LVI”.48 Moreover, the very purpose of the Pact is 
to facilitate dispute settlement, evidenced inter alia by the full title of the 
Pact, which would evidently be frustrated by precluding access to dispute 
settlement procedures during the one-year notice period. 
III. The Operation of a Contrario Arguments 
At the start of this article, two questions were raised: how has a contrario 
interpretation been used by the World Court, and how might we explain 
47. Alleged Violations, supra note 1 at para 37. 
48. Ibid at para 40. 
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its significance? The judgments and advisory opinions examined above 
shed some light on the answers to these questions, which are further 
elaborated below. 
Perhaps the most noticeable element of the jurisprudence on a 
contrario interpretation is that the Court does not assimilate or subsume 
the principle within the framework of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention. Indeed, the Court most explicitly recognised the autonomous 
nature of the principle in Alleged Violations/Questions of Delimitation, 
when it stated that a contrario interpretation in effect only operated as a 
result of (i.e. after) the application of the factors listed in Article 31(1). 
This might seem to be a minor point, but it is nevertheless notable, 
demonstrating that the Court has used or made reference to uncodified 
interpretative principles that lay outside the remit of those Articles 31 
and 32. Whilst much of the academic literature inevitably elaborates how 
those provisions have been understood and applied by various courts and 
tribunals, the vast majority of it does not pay much attention to the 
operation and character of uncodified interpretative principles. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the use of such principles is 
perfectly in keeping with the drafting history of the Vienna Convention 
provisions. It was the work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) 
on the law of treaties that provided the blueprint for a convention to 
the Vienna Conference in 1968 and 1969, which ultimately adopted 
many of the proposed provisions without change.49 Most pertinently, 
the Commission did not aim to be exhaustive when it outlined the 
factors that an interpreter should or could take account of in Articles 
31 and 32; instead, the Special Rapporteur on the topic at that time, Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, noted that the Commission should “seek to isolate 
and to codify the comparatively few rules which appear to constitute 
49. For greater detail on the history to Articles 31 and 32 on the Vienna 
Convention, see Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 2d (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015) ch 2.
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the strictly legal basis of the interpretation of treaties”.50 There were, he 
acknowledged, myriad other principles “whose appropriateness in any 
given case depends so much on the particular context and on a subjective 
appreciation of varying circumstances” that the Commission should not 
attempt to codify.51 A contrario interpretation clearly falls within this 
category of interpretative principles that has hitherto attracted scant 
attention.
The second notable aspect of the Court’s use of a contrario reasoning 
is that it is always used as an auxiliary method of interpretation by 
the Court – it is never in and of itself determinative of a particular 
interpretation. Instead, the Court uses a contrario reasoning in one of 
two ways: either it confirms an interpretation that is made on other 
grounds (such as ordinary meaning), or it is a factor that is taken into 
account alongside other considerations (such as context and or object and 
purpose) that advocate in favour of taking a certain approach.52 Whilst 
not determinative, the Court’s use of a contrario interpretation is to be 
distinguished from recourse to the subsidiary means of interpretation 
under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. The latter – the preparatory 
work and circumstances of conclusion of a treaty – can only be used to 
confirm or correct an interpretation arrived at by application of the general 
rule of interpretation in Article 31. However, the jurisprudence above 
demonstrates that a contrario interpretation is used sometimes alongside 
the context or object and purpose of a treaty as an important factor in 
deducing the intention of the parties. It is, therefore, given a significantly 
more important role than the simple corrective or confirmatory function 
that the travaux préparatoires or circumstances of conclusion of a treaty 
50. “Third Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special 
Rapporteur” (UN Doc A/CN4/167) in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1964, vol 2 (New York: UN, 1965) at 54 (UNDOC. A/
CN4/SER.A/1964/Add. 1). 
51. Ibid at 54. 
52. In the first group are the cases of the Wimbledon, supra note 12; Alleged 
Violations, supra note 1; Question of Delimitation, supra note 2; and the 
advisory opinion in Railway Traffic, supra note 21. In the second group of 
cases, one could count the judgments in the Tehran Hostages, supra note 
28; and Niger, supra note 37 cases.
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play under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. The Frontier Dispute 
(Burkina Faso/Niger) judgment provides an illustrative example of this. 
It should be recalled that in that case, the Court commenced its analysis 
with a contrario interpretation that, although not determinative of the 
Court’s approach, was the first of three factors that led the Court to reject 
Burkina Faso’s argument. This shows that a contrario interpretation may 
sometimes be used not only as a distinct interpretative principle from 
those codified in the provisions of the Vienna Convention, but also in a 
way that does not clearly fit within the schema instituted by Articles 31 
and 32. 
This leads to a final point which is worth considering in this analysis 
– why does a contrario interpretation have any weight in the reasoning of 
the Court? The jurisprudence analysed above demonstrates that the Court 
has used a contrario interpretation as a manner of framing its reasoning 
regarding the intentions of the parties, or of confirming its conclusions.53 
This was most clearly expressed by the Court in the recent judgments 
on preliminary objections in Alleged Violations/Questions of Delimitation, 
in which the Court stated that recourse to an a contrario interpretation 
is only justified “when it is appropriate in light of the text of all the 
provisions concerned, their context and the object and purpose of the 
treaty”.54 All these elements – the text, context, and object and purpose 
of a treaty – are drawn on by the Court in order to determine whether 
it was the intention of the parties to include explicitly some categories or 
provisions and exclude others. 
One might contend that this is open to criticism insofar as the ILC 
explicitly rejected the idea that the goal of interpretation was to search for 
the intentions of the parties. The “intentionalist” approach, advocated 
53. Indeed, tribunals have held that not every inclusion in a treaty text 
justifies the inference that other categories were intentionally excluded; 
some provisions are placed in treaties ex abundanti cautela. See Alleged 
Violations, ibid at para 43; see also, Différend interprétation et application 
des dispositions de l’Article 78, par. 7, du Traité de Paix au territoire éthiopien 
— Décisions nos 176 et 201 rendues respectivement en date des 1er juillet 
1954 et 16 mars 1956, XIII RIAA 636 at 649.  
54. Alleged Violations, ibid at para 37.
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by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht amongst others,55 curried little favour with 
the majority of members in the ILC, who were instead of the view that 
“the elucidation of the meaning of the text rather than an investigation 
ab initio of the supposed intentions of the parties constitutes the object 
of interpretation”.56 Importantly, however, the Commission did not 
reject the notion that the purpose of interpretation was to give effect 
to the intention of the parties;57 instead, it simply recognised that the 
interpreter should not be given free rein to consult any materials that they 
desired, such as the preparatory work of a treaty. The division between 
“textualists” and “intentionalists” in the Commission was, therefore, 
a division not regarding the importance of intention to interpretation 
but rather about the appropriate method to find the parties’ intention; 
the latter group considered that any useful material could be consulted 
whereas the former were of the view that the text of the treaty constituted 
the “authentic expression” of the parties’ intention.58 As such, it is correct 
to say that the elements codified in Articles 31 and 32 are simply the 
means of interpretation admissible for ascertaining the intention of 
55. See in particular the report of Lauterpacht in his capacity as Special 
Rapporteur for the topic of treaty interpretation in the Institut de Droit 
International: Hersch Lauterpacht, “L’Interprétation des traités”, (1950) 
43:1 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 367. 
56. “Reports of the International Law Commission on the second part of 
its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session” (UN Doc A/6309/
Rev 1) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol 2 
(New York: UN, 1967) at 223 (UNDOC. A/CN4/SER.A/1964/Add. 1) 
[Reports]. 
57. Indeed, the first Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission 
on the topic explicitly noted that the purpose of interpretation was 
“to give effect to the intention of the Parties as fully and fairly as 
possible”: James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the 
International Law of Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928) at 
168. 
58. Reports, supra note 56 at 220. 
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the parties,59 and that they provide the interpreter with the tools to 
determine whether the parties intended to include certain categories to 
the detriment of others. 
IV. Conclusion
This brief study of a contrario interpretation has shed some light on its 
character and operation, demonstrating that it is used by the World 
Court as a subsidiary means of interpretation which functions alongside 
or in support of the provisions of the Vienna Convention. Whilst one 
hopes that this is useful in itself, the study also serves the broader purpose 
of demonstrating that there are still unanswered questions in the field 
of interpretation that could fruitfully be the subject of academic study. 
Despite the numerous books that have been published on the topic in 
the past decade, there remains space for academics and practitioners to 
further elucidate and debate how judicial institutions should interpret 
international law. This symposium, focussing on interpretation in 
international law, is therefore a welcome addition to the literature, and 
it is to be hoped that the following articles will engender lively debate in 
the international law community and beyond.
 
59. Ibid at 218-19. See also Eirik Bjorge, “The Vienna Rules, Evolutionary 
Interpretation, and the Intentions of the Parties” in Andrea Bianchi, 
Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, eds, Interpretation in International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 189.
